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In two recent decisions concerning copyright's fair use doc-
trine, the Second Circuit addressed the lawfulness of incorporat-
ing one creative work into a new one. In both Cariou v Princel
and Salinger u Colting,2 US District Judge Deborah Batts en-
joined similar activity using nearly identical reasoning.3 But on
appeal, the Second Circuit found fair use in the former4 and like-
ly infringement in the latter.5 In this short essay, we welcome
the Cariou decision's shift away from the singular, subjective in-
tent of the putative fair user towards a more audience-focused
inquiry. When Cariou is compared with Salinger, however, we
are concerned that this shift introduces a new set of distribu-
tional problems into the fair use analysis.
In particular, why does a substantial reworking of Catcher
in the Rye interfere with J.D. Salinger's "right not to authorize
derivative works"6 while Patrick Cariou's photographs are the
"raw material"7 for the "well-known appropriation artist" Rich-
ard Prince?8 Is a use fair only if Anna Wintour, Brad Pitt, and
Beyonc6 are there to see it?9 We recognize that courts must have
a means of distinguishing "transformative" uses from "market
substitutes," 10 but in doing so we hope that courts do not convert
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1 784 F Supp 2d 337 (SDNY 2011).
2 641 F Supp 2d 250 (SDNY 2009).
3 Compare Cariou, 784 F Supp 2d at 353-54, with Salinger, 641 F Supp 2d at 268.
4 Cariou u Prince, 714 F3d 694, 712 (2d Cir 2013).
5 Salinger u Colting, 607 F3d 68, 83-84 (2d Cir 2010). While there is a relatively
obvious argument that neither panel was particularly worried about interpanel con-
sistency and each was simply trying to push the law in a slightly different direction, we
note that Judge Peter Hall sat on both panels and voted with the majority in both deci-
sions. Intentional contradiction therefore seems unlikely, though stranger things have
happened.
6 Id at 74.
7 Cariou, 714 F3d at 706.
8 Id at 699.
9 Id at 709.
10 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569, 587 (1994).
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the right to rework, comment on, or otherwise engage with crea-
tive works into a privilege largely reserved for the rich and fa-
mous.
I. DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS: SALINGER AND CARIOU IN THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT
In both Salinger and Cariou, Judge Batts rejected a fair use
defense for creative endeavors that she found insufficiently cri-
tiqued and commented on earlier copyrighted works. In Salin-
ger, Fredrik Colting's novel, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the
Rye, featured a number of storylines and characters from J.D.
Salinger's Catcher in the Rye, including a seventy-six-year-old
Holden Caulfield and a character modeled on Salinger himself."
In Cariou, Richard Prince incorporated photos taken by Patrick
Cariou of Jamaican Rastafarians into a series of thirty paint-
ings, titled Canal Zone, that was exhibited in 2008 at the Gag-
osian Gallery in Manhattan.12 In both cases Judge Batts issued
an injunction-preliminary in Salinger, permanent in Cariou-
solely based on the merits, without considering the additional
requirements for injunctive relief.13
In Salinger, Judge Batts rejected Colting's argument that
his novel was a "parody" of Catcher and therefore a permissible
"transformative use."14 Considering the purpose and character of
the use,15 Judge Batts stated that parody includes "only those el-
ements which criticize or comment upon the source author's
work[ ]" and concluded that 60 Years "contains no reasonably
11 Salinger, 641 F Supp 2d at 258.
12 Some of the paintings took enlarged, cropped, and tinted versions of Cariou's
photographs and collaged and painted elements on top of them. Other paintings used the
photographs as collage elements alongside other appropriated photos. See Cariou, 714
F3d at 669 n 2.
13 See Winter v Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 US 7, 20 (2008) ("A plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the mer-
its, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.");
eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388 (2006) (vacating a permanent injunction
where the Federal Circuit failed to apply traditional four-part test for injunctive relief).
14 Salinger, 641 F Supp 2d at 256-57. See also Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc,
510 US 569, 579-80 (1994) ("[P]arody has an obvious claim to transformative value.").
15 Section 107 of the Copyright Act instructs courts to consider four factors in de-
termining whether a use of a copyrighted work is fair: the purpose and character of the
use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used, and the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work. See 17 USC § 107.
Although Judge Batts considered all four fair use factors, her analyses in the two deci-
sions largely focused on the first and fourth factors, and accordingly ours does as well.
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discernable [sic] rejoinder or specific criticism of any character
or theme of Catcher." 16 Even though the novel, according to lit-
erary expert Martha Woodmansee, "critically examin[ed] the
character Holden, and his presentation in Catcher as an authen-
tic and admirable (maybe even heroic) figure," Judge Batts ob-
served that the themes in 60 Years were "already thoroughly
depicted and apparent in Salinger's own narrative about Caul-
field." 17 Moreover, given earlier statements by reviewers and the
defendant himself that 60 Years was a "marvelous sequel" and
"tribute" to Catcher,18 "[i]t [was] simply not credible for Defend-
ant Colting to assert now that his primary purpose was to cri-
tique Salinger and his persona."19
Regarding the effect of the use upon the potential market
for the copyrighted work, Judge Batts concluded, "the publishing
of 60 Years and similar widespread works could substantially
harm the market for a Catcher sequel or other derivative
works."20 It didn't matter that Salinger "ha[d] not demonstrated
any interest in publishing a sequel or other derivative work of
Catcher," because he "ha[d] the right to change his mind" and
was "entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his [derivative
works]."21 Moreover, "[]ust as licensing of derivatives is an im-
portant economic incentive to the creation of originals, so too
will the right not to license derivatives sometimes act as an in-
centive to the creation of originals."22
Judge Batts's decision two years later in Cariou employed a
remarkably similar analysis.23 Judge Batts reiterated, "all of the
precedent this Court can identify imposes a requirement that
the new work in some way comment on, relate to the historical
context of, or critically refer back to the original works."24 Rely-
ing principally on Prince's testimony that he didn't "really have
a message," Judge Batts concluded, "Prince did not intend to
comment on any aspects of the original works or on the broader
16 Salinger, 641 F Supp 2d at 257-58.
17 Id at 258.
18 Id at 260 n 3.
19 Id at 262.
20 Salinger, 641 F Supp 2d at 267.
21 Id at 268 (alteration omitted), quoting Salinger u Random House, Inc, 811 F2d
90, 99 (2d Cir 1987) (barring inclusion of Salinger's unpublished letters in an unauthor-
ized biography).
22 Salinger, 641 F Supp 2d at 268.
23 See Cariou, 784 F Supp 2d at 343-54.
24 Id at 348.
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culture."25 Additionally, as in Salinger, "Defendants' protesta-
tions that Cariou has not marketed his Photos more aggressive-
ly ... [were] unavailing."26 Judge Batts reiterated that it is the
"potential market" for derivatives that matters for purposes of
fair use, "even if the author has disavowed any intention to pub-
lish them during his lifetime."27 Accordingly, Judge Batts (1)
granted summary judgment to Cariou; (2) barred defendants
from selling, displaying, and marketing the Canal Zone paint-
ings; and (3) ordered them to "deliver up for impounding, de-
struction, or other disposition . . . all infringing copies of the
Photographs."28
II. COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS: SALINGER AND CARIOUAT THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
Despite the similar analyses in each case-defendants had
not intended to comment on plaintiffs' work, and it was legally
irrelevant that plaintiffs had not actively pursued derivative
markets-on appeal the two Second Circuit panels reached op-
posing results.
In Salinger, the court's decision focused primarily on the
appropriate standard for issuing a preliminary injunction, and it
remanded to the district court to apply the correct test. The
court ordered the district court to consider the defendant's "First
Amendment interest in the freedom to express him or herself'
and the "public's interest in free expression," but also noted "a
copyright holder might also have a First Amendment interest in
not speaking."29
Although the court vacated the preliminary injunction, it
nonetheless "in the interest of judicial economy" noted that
"there is no reason to disturb" the district court's consideration
of the merits. 30 The Second Circuit mentioned the district court's
observations that "parody must critique or comment on the work
itself," and the panel found no clear error in Judge Batts's de-
termination that it was "simply not credible for Defendant Colt-
ing to assert .. . that his primary purpose was to critique Sal-
25 Id at 349.
26 Id at 353.
27 Cariou, 784 F Supp 2d at 353 (quotation marks omitted).
28 Id at 355.
29 Salinger, 607 F3d at 81.
30 Id at 83
2013] 91
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inger and his persona."31 The panel acknowledged that it "may
be" that fair use could favor a defendant without a "transforma-
tive purpose," but it concluded that in light of "the District
Court's credibility finding together with all the other facts in
this case[,] . . . Defendants are not likely to prevail in their fair
use defense."32
In Cariou, the Second Circuit took a different stance to-
wards the accused infringer's stated intentions and the copy-
right owner's right not to authorize derivatives. Under the pur-
pose and character of the use, the court declared, "The law
imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or
its author in order to be considered transformative."33 Instead,
"[i]f the secondary use adds value to the original-if [the original
work] is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings-this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine
intends to protect."34 Because at least twenty-five35 of Prince's
paintings "manifest[ed] an entirely different aesthetic from Car-
iou's photographs," they were "transformative as a matter of
law."36
In contrast to the witness-credibility determination found
dispositive in Salinger, the Court of Appeals found inconsequen-
tial Cariou's statement that he doesn't "really have a message."37
The Second Circuit emphasized that "Prince's work could be
transformative even without commenting on Cariou's work or on
culture, and even without Prince's stated intention to do so."38
Instead, "[w]hat is critical is how the work in question appears
to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say
about a particular piece or body of work."39
This central concept of a "reasonable observer" also appears
to have driven the court's analysis of the effect on the potential
market. The court observed that Prince's work "appeals to an
entirely different sort of collector than Cariou's" and that the
31 Id at 73, 83.
32 Id at 83.
33 Cariou, 714 F3d at 706.
34 Id (alteration omitted).
35 The court remanded as to the remaining five works, which the court found "do
not sufficiently differ" from the originals "for us to confidently make a determination
about their transformative nature as a matter of law." Id at 710-11.
36 Id at 706, 711.
37 Cariou, 714 F3d at 707.
38 Id.
39 Id at 709
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opening dinner for the Gagosian show "included a number of the
wealthy and famous."40 The invitation list included:
Jay-Z and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and Jeff
Koons, professional football player Tom Brady, model Gisele
Bundchen, Vanity Fair editor Graydon Carter, Vogue editor
Anna Wintour, authors Jonathan Franzen and Candace
Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro, Angelina Jolie, and
Brad Pitt.41
Moreover, Prince sold eight artworks for $10,480,000, and ex-
changed seven others for works by Larry Rivers and Richard
Serra. By contrast, "Cariou ha[d] not aggressively marketed his
work, and ha[d] earned just over $8,000 in royalties."42 The court
clarified that an accused infringer only usurps the market for
derivatives "where the infringer's target audience and the na-
ture of the infringing content is the same as the original,"43 and
there was nothing to suggest that anyone wouldn't purchase
Cariou's work as a result of the "market space that Prince's
work has taken up."44 The court accordingly vacated the injunc-
tion, reversed as to twenty-five of Prince's paintings, and re-
manded as to the remaining five.45
III. FAIR USE FOR THE RICH AND FABULOUS?
The Second Circuit's opinion in Cariou significantly im-
proves the state of copyright fair use precedent (at least in the
Second Circuit), but is by no means perfect. The opinion takes
great strides in jettisoning the much-criticized "commentary"
requirement in favor of a broader understanding of transforma-
tive use, but it loses its footing in emphasizing the differences in
cultural and economic status among the art, artists, and audi-
ences in question.46
40 Id.




45 Cariou, 714 F3d at 712 & n 5 (observing that "destruction of Prince's artwork
would be improper and against the public interest").
46 In addition to the two concerns described in depth in this Part, we also note
briefly the Cariou court's unfortunate decision to analyze Prince's works individually
instead of relative to each other. Especially with respect to appropriation art, the trans-
formative effect of a work that may seem minimally transformative in isolation will often
become apparent only when the work is considered in thematic context.
2013] 93
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A. Cariou's Virtues
First, the Second Circuit's opinion in Cariou shifted the doc-
trine away from a rather long line of cases requiring the puta-
tive fair user to "at least in part" comment on the borrowed work
itself.47 Although "comment" is mentioned in § 107's nonexhaus-
tive list of activities protected as fair use, 48 the statute in no way
limits the object of this commentary to the copyrighted work it-
self. Nonetheless, when confronted with expressive works, many
courts have drawn from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc49 and turned the first-factor
analysis into a categorical binary. These courts distinguished
parody, which comments directly on the work from which it
draws, from satire, which comments more broadly on society.
This distinction ultimately reduced to the question: What is the
second user commenting on? "Parodies" were generally held pro-
tected while "satires" were not.50
Cariou, more than any other case to this point,51 clarifies
how unhelpful the parody/satire distinction is in analyzing fair
47 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569, 580 (1994). See also Part I. Other
nonexpressive uses are often found transformative on grounds of transformative purpose.
See, for example, Bill Graham Archives u Dorling Kindersley Ltd, 448 F3d 605, 612-13
(2d Cir 2006) (holding the use of copyrighted posters as part of historical account of the
Grateful Dead to be fair use); Hofheinz u A & E Television Networks, 146 F Supp 2d 442,
446 (SDNY 2001) ("[O]ur cases establish that biographies in general and critical biog-
raphies in particular, fit 'comfortably within' these statutory categories 'of uses illustra-
tive of uses that can be fair."'); Perfect 10, Inc u Amazon.com, Inc, 508 F3d 1146, 1165
(9th Cir 2007) (holding that Google's use of thumbnail images for its search engine was
"highly transformative").
48 17 USC § 107 (" [T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as crit-
icism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
49 510 US 569 (1994).
50 See, for example, Suntrust Bank u Houghton Mifflin Co, 268 F3d 1257, 1269
(11th Cir 2001) (finding a novel that utilized characters and scenes from Gone with the
Wind a "specific criticism of and rejoinder to the depiction of slavery and the relation-
ships between blacks and whites" in Gone with the Wind"); Leibovitz v Paramount Pic-
tures Corp, 137 F3d 109, 114 (2d Cir 1998) ("Applying Campbell ... we inquire whether
Paramount's advertisement 'may reasonably be perceived,' as a new work that 'at least
in part, comments on' Leibovitz's photograph."), quoting Campbell, 510 US at 580-82;
Dr. Seuss Enterprises, LP u Penguin Books USA, Inc, 109 F3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir 1997)
("Although The Cat NOT in the Hat! does broadly mimic Dr. Seuss' characteristic style,
it does not hold his style up to ridicule."). See also Bruce P. Keller and Rebecca Tushnet,
Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 Trademark Rep
979, 984-99 (2004) (collecting and describing cases).
51 Other cases, like Blanch u Koons, 467 F3d 244 (2d Cir 2006), signaled a shift
away from the commentary requirement, but none did so as firmly and explicitly as Car-
iou. See Blanch, 467 F3d at 253 (finding fair use where appropriation artist Jeff Koons'
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use and ultimately how pernicious the distinction can be in
practice.52 Scholars have noted many problems with the paro-
dy/satire distinction, including the lack of a "true division" be-
tween the labelS53 and the distinction's "[p]ractical
[s]1ipperiness."54 Most importantly, though, the "parody" and
"satire" labels turn out to be poor proxies for determining
whether a given use should be held fair when the other fair use
factors are considered. As Bruce Keller and Professor Rebecca
Tushnet note, neither label offers any real guidance for distin-
guishing "markets that copyright owners are unlikely to devel-
op" from those they might develop.55 Further, the distinction
doesn't account for the significant social value created by a well-
done satire-dissent can be a value in itself,56 allowing for socie-
tal discussion about normative values through a common means
of expression and understanding.57 Moving beyond the paro-
dy/satire distinction, an appropriation artist should not be cate-
gorically barred from her chosen genre due to concerns about
copyright infringement any more than a biographer should need
to be a literary analyst in order for her work to qualify for fair
use's protection.58 The "commentary on the original" require-
used a copyrighted photograph "as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic
consequences of mass media").
52 See Cariou, 714 F3d at 707-08.
53 Keller and Tushnet, 94 Trademark Rep at 985 (cited in note 50), citing Tyler T.
Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 45 J Copy-
right Socy USA 546, 557 (1998). This view, however, is not universal. See, for example,
Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J Legal Stud 67, 71 (1992) ("[T]he [par-
ody] doctrine should provide a defense to infringement only if the parody uses the paro-
died work as a target rather than as a weapon or . . . simply as a resource to create a
comic effect.").
54 Keller and Tushnet, 94 Trademark Rep at 992 ("When a 'fertile imagination or a
literature degree' can define a work as parody instead of satire, we should be unsur-
prised that lawyers possessed of one (or both) can manipulate the distinction.") (citation
omitted), quoting Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, 4 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.02[C][2] at 13-217 (Bender 2002).
55 Id at 995-99 (noting many instances of publishers licensing or creating parodies
of their own works).
56 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L J 535, 549-52 (2004).
57 See Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett's License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and
Markets, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent L J 589, 603-04 (2002) ("The gains to the general public
from satire, if anything, seem greater than in parody. There are profound benefits to be
had when artists and writers can make use of recognized artifacts and icons to ridicule
or criticize political institutions, cultural values, or media presentations."); Rosemary J.
Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the
Law 264-72 (Duke 1998).
58 See generally Michael C. Donaldson, Refuge from the Storm: A Fair Use Safe
Harbor for Non-fiction Works, 59 J Copyright Socy USA 477 (2012).
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ment and related parody/satire distinction unduly impinges on
artists' right to speak freely using their chosen media.
Second, the Court of Appeals in Cariou rightfully moved
away from past cases' reliance on the artist's authorial intent in
determining whether a use might be fair.59 For years, courts
have struggled with how to differentiate the "real artists" from
those who use copyrighted works "to avoid the drudgery in work-
ing up something fresh."60 Cariou recognizes the futility in try-
ing to distinguish "real" from "post-hoc" artistic purposes. Pur-
poses are always varied and sometimes conflicting, making it
impossible, or at least unnecessarily reductive, to try to identify
an artist's sole motivation in using a work.61 Cariou wisely takes
the highly manipulable question of artistic intent 62 out of the
59 Cariou, 714 F3d at 707 ("What is critical is how the work in question appears to
the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or
body of work. Prince's work could be transformative . . . even without Prince's stated in-
tention to [comment on Cariou's work or on culture]."). For cases attempting to identify
individual purposes behind a work, see Castle Rock Entertainment u Carol Publishing
Group, Inc, 150 F3d 132, 143 (2d Cir 1998) ("The SATs plain purpose, therefore, is not to
expose Seinfelds 'nothingness,' but to satiate Seinfeld fans' passion for the 'nothingness'
that Seinfeld has elevated into the realm of protectable creative expression."); Ringgold v
Black Entertainment Television, Inc, 126 F3d 70, 78 n 8 (2d Cir 1997) ("Ringgold's work
was used by defendants for precisely the decorative purpose that was a principal reason
why she created it.").
60 Campbell, 510 US at 580. See also, for example, Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc u
Passport Video, 349 F3d 622, 628 (9th Cir 2003) (characterizing the defendant's use as
"seek[ing] to profit at least in part from the inherent entertainment value of Elvis' ap-
pearances"); Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc u RDR Books, 575 F Supp 2d 513, 547
(SDNY 2008) ("[A] copier is not entitled to copy the vividness of an author's description
for the sake of accurately reporting expressive content.").
61 See Julie Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 UC Davis L Rev
1151, 1178 (2007) ("There is broad agreement among creative individuals of all types
that creativity is characterized pervasively by a not knowing in advance that encom-
passes both inspiration and production."); Ochoa, 45 J Copyright Socy USA at 557 ("[The
parody/satire distinction] assumes that courts can definitively determine an author's in-
tent in writing a particular work, a task that many literary scholars argue is both foolish
to attempt and impossible to achieve.") (footnote omitted). For commentary on the de-
scriptive failures of an atomistic model of creativity, see Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of
Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 513, 522-37 (2010)
(describing how "[m]any standard experiences of creativity simply do not fit into the [pe-
cuniary] incentive model[ ]").
62 The two Second Circuit decisions addressing work by artist Jeff Koons highlight
the manipulability of artist statements as evidence of fair use. Compare Rogers u Koons,
960 F2d 301, 309 (2d Cir 1992) (noting Koons's statement that the meaning of the par-
ticular underlying works he utilized was immaterial to his artistic purposes), with
Blanch, 396 F Supp 2d at 480-81, affd 467 F3d 244 (2d Cir 2006):
To me, the legs depicted in the Allure photograph are a fact in the world, some-
thing that everyone experiences constantly; they are not anyone's legs in par-
ticular. By using a fragment of the Allure photograph in my painting, I thus
9
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picture by instead examining "how the artworks may 'reasona-
bly be perceived' in order to assess their transformative na-
ture."63 Hopefully, judges in other circuits will take Cariou's cue
and recognize the drawbacks of relying primarily on witness
statements instead of reasonable readers' responses. 64
B. Cariou's Follies
1. Raw vs. Cooked?
Scholars have long acknowledged that copyright law values
certain creative activities over others.65 Copyright typically re-
wards those endeavors that map most easily onto a romanticized
"pure" artist who produces a new work of authorship from a
blank slate.66 Because copyright privileges "originality," copy-
comment upon the culture and attitudes promoted and embodied in Allure
Magazine.
It's entirely possible Koons intended to comment on Blanch's photograph in a way he
didn't with respect to the images used in his earlier work. But it's equally possible, and
quite likely, the second time around he knew which buzzwords to reference: "transform,"
"message," "meaning," and the implication that he was commenting on the photo (as an
instantiation of Allure's values).
63 Cariou, 714 F3d at 707, quoting Campbell, 510 US at 582. See also David A. Si-
mon, Reasonable Perception and Parody in Copyright Law, 2010 Utah L Rev 779, 788
("The need for examining whether the author sought to avoid work (i.e., cognitive lazi-
ness) is irrelevant here in the same way that it is irrelevant to determining whether an
author's work is significantly 'original to gain copyright protection.").
64 See, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and Epis-
temological Humility, 25 L & Lit 20, 28 (2013) ("[W]hen reasonable audience members
could discern commentary on the original work, a court should find favored 'parody,'
even when other reasonable audience members could disagree."); Laura A. Heymann,
Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 Colum J L & Arts 445,
448 (2007) ("[T]he better test of whether a second work has contributed a 'new expres-
sion, meaning, or message' to the first is to turn to the reader, the one who 'holds togeth-
er in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted."').
65 See, for example, James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the
Construction of the Information Society 51-60 (Harvard 1996); Madhavi Sunder, The In-
vention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 L & Contemp Probs 97, 100 (Spring 2007); Sonia K.
Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 Wash U L Rev 489, 497 (2006) ("[Intellectual property
law] enables certain types of legal and illegal dissent, conferring legitimacy on some
types of speech through the prism of fair use, but often excluding other types of expres-
sion from protection."); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private
Intellectual Property and the Public Domain Part I, 18 Colum J L & Arts 1, 35-45 (1993).
66 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L J 965, 965 (1990) ("Our
copyright law is based on the charming notion that authors create something from noth-
ing, that works owe their origin to the authors who produce them."). See also Boyle,
Shamans, Software and Spleens at x-xiii (cited in note 65); Peter Jaszi, On the Author
Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, in Martha Woodmansee and
Peter Jaszi, eds, The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Lit-
erature 29, 29 (Duke 1994).
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right commentators often associate the resulting devaluation of
downstream, "second-generation" authorship with limited fair
use protections.67 But as Professor Mark Lemley has observed,
"[o]ne could invoke the language of romantic authorship either
to demand strong copyright protection for a first-generation au-
thor or to demand an expansive interpretation of fair use for a
second-generation author who has 'transformed' a first-
generation work."68
Cariou and Salinger highlight the malleability of originality
and authorship rhetoric within copyright law. Plaintiff J.D. Sal-
inger had a "First Amendment interest in not speaking" and the
"right not to authorize derivative works" ;69 Plaintiff Patrick Car-
iou had no "inevitable, divine, or natural right" to absolute own-
ership of his creations, which are used as "raw material [ ]... in
the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights
and understandings." 70 Defendant Fredrik Colting's critique was
"not credible"; Defendant Richard Prince's "message" didn't mat-
ter.71
It's unclear why the Second Circuit employed such different
rhetoric to the parties in the two cases. The court in Cariou em-
phasized that a work's transformative nature is determined
from the perspective of the "reasonable observer,"72 but who are
these observers? Apparently they're not the scholars who testi-
fied to 60 Years's critical character,73 but they may very well be
the parade of celebrities, socialites, and famous artists the court
identified at the opening of Canal Zone. The court emphasized
that an infringer's "target audience" must be "the same as the
original," and that "Prince's work appeals to an entirely differ-
67 See, for example, Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement
and the Fiction of the Work, 68 Chi Kent L Rev 725, 794 (1993) ("The plaintiff s status as
,author' immediately elevates his or her position vis-1-vis the defendant, who is a mere
,user,' no matter how creative the second work may be.").
68 Mark A. Lemley, Book Review, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Proper-
ty, 75 Tex L Rev 873, 885 (1997). See also Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contempo-
rary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 293, 314 n 71
(1992) ("The dependence on Romantic ideas of 'authorship' by copyright law limits the
availability of the 'fair use' defense . . . . The same conception of "authorship," however,
has been invoked to justify 'fair use."').
69 Salinger, 607 F3d at 74, 81.
70 Cariou, 714 F3d at 705, 706.
71 Cariou, 714 F3d at 707.
72 Id.
73 See Salinger, 607 F3d at 72 (summarizing declarations of Professors Martha
Woodmansee and Robert Spoo).
98 [80:88
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ent sort of collector than Cariou's."74 But this did not appear to
be due to a different intended audience-both Cariou and Prince
were in discussions with New York City art gallery owners. 75 In-
stead, the difference seems to revolve around Prince's celebrity,
the exclusive price tag on his work, and the Gagosian Gallery's
portfolio of wealthy contacts. It might be appropriate for fair use
to inquire into whether the two works appeal to "distinct and
separate discursive communit[ies],"76 but what demarcates the
lines between such communities?77
Professor Lawrence Lessig observed, "fair use in America
simply means the right to hire a lawyer."78 Cartou and Salinger
suggest that wealth and fame may entitle an author not just to a
robust legal defense, but also to a privileged position in harness-
ing copyright's rhetoric. The famous artist understandably has
greater ability to influence her potential audience than the un-
74 Cariou, 714 F3d at 709.
75 See id at 703-04. One could, of course, define the artists' intended audiences
more broadly (any art gallery or the entire consumer market) or more narrowly (Lower
East Side art galleries dealing in high-concept appropriation art). As Professors Mark
Lemley and Mark McKenna have written, fair use determinations are made using im-
plicit market definitions-a court that interprets copyrights broadly will also tend to
conceive of available markets broadly, and vice versa. See Mark A. Lemley and Mark P.
McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP,
100 Geo L J 2055, 2074-76, 2107 (2012) (arguing that fair use should be found unless a
'market-substituting effect can be traced to the protectable elements of the copyrighted
work"). Parsing the market by class and income seems theoretically sensible but for the
problematic distributional consequences.
76 Heymann, 31 Colum J L & Arts at 449 (cited in note 64).
77 Professor Rebecca Tushnet notes that an audience-focused approach to fair use
might transfer existing problems with judges making aesthetic judgments into problems
"defining who counts as a 'reasonable' audience member." Tushnet, 25 L & Lit at 29 (cit-
ed in note 64). She suggests looking to the existence of "communities of practice," includ-
ing "appropriation artists, vidders, or others" to help determine "that such audiences are
both reasonable and real." Id. In our view, this practice-oriented analysis might avoid
some of the problematic socioeconomic implications and effects of Cariou's market-
oriented approach and also recognize Colting's "critical intervention" into ongoing de-
bates about Holden Caulfield and J.D. Salinger. Id at 26. In other words, although the
artist whose work is at issue should not be the definitive guide to how others perceive-or
should perceive-her work, the knowledge and experience of other artists can provide
valuable context for the fair use inquiry. See Simon, 2010 Utah L Rev at 805 (cited in
note 63):
The ["reasonably perceived" test] should assume that this reasonable perceiver
makes an interpretation of a work in context and has a familiarity with the
underlying work. Allowing a contextual analysis by someone familiar with the
underlying work prevents the law from privileging nonminority parodies and
also avoids looking to author intent.
78 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Used Technology and the Law to
Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity 187 (Penguin 2005).
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known artist,79 but the "reasonably perceived" transformative
use that results does not happen in isolation. Originality in cop-
yright depends on a plentiful supply of source material,80 and re-
gardless of whether the sources are facts, ideas, the "public do-
main," or copyrighted works, the "raw material" designation has
the potential to fall disproportionately on less-affluent creators
and laborers.81 The divide between the protected and appropria-
ble domains of copyright is porous and manipulable,82 and these
qualities generally inure to the benefit of those with the re-
sources to mine, appropriate, and exploit the raw materials of
creation.83 Cariou and Salinger remind us that this dynamic can
occur on either side of the "v."
To the extent Cariou implicitly acknowledges the intertex-
tual nature of all creative works, it is a welcome shift in the
purely author-focused jurisprudence that precedes it. But the
vast majority of creators who wish to engage with and reuse
copyrighted works may not share the circumstances that gave
rise to this doctrinal shift. If fair use is to be a "speech-
protective" safeguard,84 it certainly must develop a richer under-
standing and vocabulary for creative inspiration. But maintain-
79 See Heymann, 31 Colum J L & Arts at 450 (cited in note 64) ("An implicit state-
ment by Andy Warhol that 'this soup can is art' is likely to be reflected among readers to
a greater extent than a similar statement by an unknown artist.").
80 See, for example, Litman, 39 Emory L J at 968 (cited in note 66) ("The public
domain should be understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protec-
tion, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw mate-
rial of authorship available for authors to use.").
81 See Sunder, 70 L & Contemp Probs at 107 (cited in note 65) (arguing that fortify-
ing the boundary between "authors and raw materials ... has the perverse effect of con-
gealing poor people's knowledge as the object of property, the raw material from which
real intellectual property is derived").
82 See Julie Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public
Domain, in L. Guibault and P.B. Hugenholtz, eds, The Future of the Public Domain 121,
157 (2006) ("[P]artially or differently public without the correlative partially or different-
ly private is a non sequitur."); Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of
the Public Domain, 92 Cal L Rev 1331, 1339 (2004) ("Private property and the public
domain are paired together in a perpetual dance.").
83 See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 Am U J
Gender Soc Pol & L 183, 202 (2006) ("It may be those entities already endowed with the
greatest resources that are best positioned to take advantage of such freely available re-
sources."). See also Chander and Sunder, 92 Cal L Rev at 1343 (cited in note 82) ("[T]he
public domain is essential to our private property system because it offers a sphere of
free works upon which capitalists can draw without either seeking consent or drawing
liability."); Aoki, 18 Colum J L & Arts at 39-40 (cited in note 65) (observing that treating
"alternate types of cultural production" as "sources" for original authorship sets up these
cultural productions "for over-exploitation and eventual depletion or destruction").
84 See Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 219-20 (2003).
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ing a conceptual wedge between "raw" and "cooked" culture is a
highly problematic way of doing so.8 Cariou makes fair use fair-
er for some, but there's a real risk its virtues won't be available
to all.86
2. High vs. Low?
These distributional concerns are not unique to Cariou and
Salinger. Although the trend isn't universal,87 conventionally
popular litigants do tend to win in fair use case law.88 Catcher in
the Rye and Salinger are beloved hallmarks of American litera-
85 See Sunder, 70 L & Contemp Probs at 107 (cited in note 65). For commentary on
the hierarchies perpetuated by distinctions between raw/cooked and nature/culture, see
Sherry B. Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture, in Michelle Zimbalist
Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds, Women, Culture, and Society 67, 80 (Stanford 1974)
(observing that the transformation from raw to cooked is associated with transition from
nature to culture and that women typically appear "to have stronger and more direct
connections with nature"); Carol MacCormack and Marilyn Strathern, eds, Nature, Cul-
ture and Gender (Cambridge 1980).
86 This problem isn't limited solely to copyright, but extends to other analogous
rights as well. For example, the California Supreme Court, in a major case involving that
state's right-of-publicity statute, held that lithographs and charcoal drawings featuring
the Three Stooges violated rights in the Stooges' personae. It noted, however:
[W]e do not hold that all reproductions of celebrity portraits are unprotected by
the First Amendment. The silkscreens of Andy Warhol, for example, have as
their subjects the images of such celebrities as Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Tay-
lor, and Elvis Presley. Through distortion and the careful manipulation of con-
text, Warhol was able to convey a message that went beyond the commercial
exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on
the dehumanization of celebrity itself. Such expression may well be entitled to
First Amendment protection.
Comedy III Productions, Inc, v Gary Saderup, Inc, 21 P3d 797, 811 (Cal 2001) (citation
and footnote omitted).
87 See, for example, Rogers, 960 F2d at 301.
88 See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St L J 47, 78 (2011) (summariz-
ing empirical data and noting a persistent "overdog effect in relation to fair use litiga-
tion"). See also, for example, Brownmark Films, LLC v Comedy Partners, 682 F3d 687,
692 (7th Cir 2012) (holding recreation of the viral video "What What (In the Butt)" in an
episode of South Park to be "an obvious case of fair use"); Bourne Co v Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp, 602 F Supp 2d 499, 511 (SDNY 2009) (holding that use of the song
"When You Wish Upon a Star" by the television show Family Guy qualified as fair use);
Warner Brothers Entertainment, 575 F Supp 2d at 513 (rejecting a fair use defense for
use of J.K. Rowling's copyrighted works in a Harry Potter encyclopedia). By contrast,
artists operating in comparatively marginalized art forms often lose. For example, in
Morris v Guetta a district court found street artist Mr. Brainwash's creative labor to pale
in comparison to the value provided by the photograph of Sid Vicious he used as source
material. Morris, 2013 WL 440127, *8 (CD Cal) ("The Photograph is a picture of Sid Vi-
cious making a distinct facial expression. Defendants' works are of Sid Vicious making
that same expression. . . . Defendants' works remain at their core pictures of Sid Vi-
cious.").
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ture, and Colting's novel is seen as a simple retread;89 Cariou's
pictures, which nobody seems to like all that much,u are grist
for Prince's high-concept art mill.91 Jeff Koons's work was unfair
when he was exhibiting at relatively small galleries, but he wins
fair use arguments once he makes it to the Museum of Modern
Art (MoMA)92 and the Met, 93 at last firmly legitimated by con-
temporary society.
The problem largely appears to be one of framing.94 We un-
consciously categorize the things to which we relate and accord
respect to those things that fit within the categories we deem re-
spectable.95 Colting's book isn't the real thing-it "comes across
as fan fiction" with "none of the edginess that still oozes from
The Catcher in the Rye."96 It's not "art" so it's not fair. Although
appropriation art by Koons and Prince took a long time to gain
89 See Salinger, 641 F Supp 2d at 258 (noting that Colting's criticisms were "thor-
oughly depicted and apparent in Salinger's own narrative about Caulfield").
90 Cariou, 714 F3d at 699 (noting Cariou had earned only $8,000 from Yes, Rasta
and sold only four prints to personal acquaintances).
91 We are careful, however, to note the five works the Second Circuit remanded to
the district court for further review. Regardless, we agree with Judge Wallace, who ar-
gued in a partial concurrence that he couldn't understand how the majority could "confi-
dently" distinguish between the five remanded works and the rest. See id at 713 (Wal-
lace concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92 See Jeff Koons, The Collection, Museum of Modern Art (2013), online at
http://www.moma.org/collection/artist.phpartist-id=6622 (visited June 25, 2013) (listing
Koons's works in MoMA's permanent collection).
93 See Ken Johnson, A Panoramic Backdrop for Meaning and Mischief, NY Times
E5 (Apr 22, 2008) (describing a Koons exhibit on the roof of the Metropolitan Museum of
Art).
94 See Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experi-
ence 21-26 (Northeastern 1974); E.H. Gombrich, The Sense of Order: A Study in the Psy-
chology of Decorative Art 17-18 (Cornell 1980). See also Daniel Miller, Stuff 49-50 (Poli-
ty 2010) (tying together Professors Goffman's and Gombrich's analyses in describing
material culture).
95 See Miller, Stuff at 49 (cited in note 94) ("A more radical version of Gombrich's
thesis could argue that art itself exists only in as much as frames, such as art galleries or
the category of art itself, ensure that we pay particular respect, or pay particular money,
for that which is contained within [particular] frames."). See also Grand Upright Music
Limited v Warner Brothers Records Inc, 780 F Supp 182, 183 (SDNY 1991) (observing
that in the context of digital sampling, "[t]hou shalt not steal").
96 Richard Davies, Review of 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye (AbeBooks),
online at http://www.abebooks.com/books/coming-through-catcher-rye/
60-years-later.shtml (visited June 25, 2013). By contrast, in Morris, street art like Mr.
Brainwash's doesn't yet neatly fit society's preconception of "art," so judges characterize
it as unfair; it's not creative, it's not provocative-it's theft. See Morris, 2013 WL 440127
at *8. See also Friedman v Guetta, 2011 WL 3510890 (CD Cal). But see Brian Chidester,
The Unstoppable Ascendency of Street Art, The American Prospect (May 30, 2013), online
at http://prospect.org/article/love-letters-wall (visited June 25, 2013) (describing the in-
creasing acceptance of street art by "the establishment").
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wide cultural acceptance, it now fits quite firmly within general
understandings of contemporary art. And therefore it's held to
be fair.
While this type of framing is to some extent inevitable, we
at least hope future judges will step back and recognize the sub-
jectivity inherent in distinguishing different genres of creative
activity. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote in
Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co:97
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained on-
ly to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of ge-
nius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the
new language in which their author spoke. It may be more
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or
the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection
when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less
educated than the judge.98
Although Justice Holmes was referring to threshold determina-
tions of copyrightability, Cariou and Salinger show that judging
aesthetic value on the back end through fair use carries many of
the same risks as doing so on the front end.99 Given that aesthet-
ic value judgments in copyright cases are to some extent inevi-
table, 100 copyright law must better account for the cultural divi-
sions created, or at least reified, by such judgments.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit observed in 1992 that "there would be no
practicable boundary to the fair use defense" if the copied work
was not "at least, in part, an object of the parody" or if infringe-
ment "could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the in-
fringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use."101 In its re-
cent decision in Cariou, the Second Circuit appears to have
97 188 US 239 (1903).
98 Id at 251-52 (1903). See also id at 251.
99 Consider Keller and Tushnet, 94 Trademark Rep at 987-88 (cited in note 50).
100 See generally, for example, Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objec-
tivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments,
66 Ind L J 175 (1990).
101 Rogers u Koons, 960 F2d 301, 310 (2d Cir 1992).
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recognized the unfairness, unworkability, and empirical defi-
ciencies in these practicable boundaries. In shifting towards an
audience-focused inquiry, however, it is important that the new
boundaries of fair use are not set by socioeconomic status or ju-
dicial distinctions between high and low art.
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